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Charity as a Signal of Trustworthiness 
 
Being perceived as trustworthy comes with substantial economic benefits in many situations. 
Making other people think you are a trustworthy person may, therefore, be an important 
motive for charity and other forms of prosocial behavior, provided these activities work as 
signals of trustworthiness. This paper shows that donating money to an NGO substantially 
raises the other players’ beliefs about the donors’ trustworthiness in a simple trust game. 
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 1 Introduction
The motives for charity and prosocial behavior in general have been studied widely. Various
authors have developed theories with extrinsic, intrinsic, reputational and prestige motives
(e.g., Harbaugh 1998, B enabou and Tirole 2006), a motive of signaling wealth (Glazer and
Konrad 1996), and theories of warm-glow (e.g., Andreoni 1990).
B enabou and Tirole's (2006) and Ellingsen and Johannesson's (2008) models feature the
reputation of being a prosocial person, and the social esteem that comes along with it, as
an important motive for prosocial behavior. Indeed, several experimental studies show that
many subjects care about the other subjects' perception of their prosociality (see, e.g., Ariely
et al. 2009, Dana et al. 2006, Soetevent 2005, Andreoni and Petrie 2004, Rege and Telle
2004 or G achter and Fehr 1999). In all these studies subjects act more prosocially, if their
actions are observable by others than under privacy.
An incentive for building a reputation of being a prosocial person might be that prosocial
people benet from acts of indirect reciprocity (Alexander 1987, Nowak and Sigmund 1998).
Milinski et al. (2002) and Albert et al. (2007) demonstrate that subjects in lab experiments,
who publicly donate to an NGO, are treated better by other subjects than subjects who do
not donate or donate little.
A potentially even more important channel through which subjects benet from a rep-
utation of prosociality might be that they are perceived as more trustworthy. It has been
argued that costly signaling in the form of prosocial behavior could explain the evolution
of cooperation (Gintis et al. 2001). In Gintis et al.'s model cooperative intent, which is
obviously related to the concept of trustworthiness, is signaled by providing benets to oth-
ers. An equilibrium which separates cooperative from uncooperative people exists because
cooperative people face lower costs for providing the benets. An interesting experimental
study in this context is Barclay and Willer (2007). In their main treatment, one subject
observes two other subjects play a continuous prisoner's dilemma game, and then chooses
one of the two players as a partner for the same game in a second round. Anticipating that
cooperation in the rst round increases the probability of being selected in the second round,
the subjects in the rst round cooperate substantially more than in a control treatment, in
which partners are randomly matched in the second round. While this study indicates that
cooperative behavior leads to a reputation of cooperative intent in the same type of situation,
it does not indicate whether prosocial behavior in one situation can help to build a general
reputation of trustworthiness that carries over to other situations.
Two further studies which investigate signals of trustworthiness are Diekmann and Przepi-
2orka (2008) and Bolle and Kaehler (2007). In both studies trust games are played with two
types of trustees with dierent pay-os to cooperation. Their type is unknown to trustors
and they can signal their type by giving away gifts or by advertising (i.e., by burning money).
Both studies nd that subjects make use of the signal and this leads others to trust them
more.
The question this paper addresses, is whether charity signals trustworthiness. The utility
costs of a donation are lower for someone who has altruistic preferences, and really cares
about the goals of the charity, than for a selsh person. As more altruistic subjects are
most likely also more trustworthy, charity could play the role of a signal of trustworthiness.
Fehrler and Kosfeld (2010), for example, show that subjects who identify themselves with
the altruistic goals of an NGO are on average substantially more trustworthy than subjects
who do not and receive higher transfers from trustors. Elfenbein et al. (2010) who analyze
data from Ebay nd that sellers who commit to donate a share of the selling price of their
product to charity sell more than sellers who do not, controlling for product quality and the
reputation of the seller. This result is more pronounced for sellers who are relatively new in
the market and could not yet build up a reputation of trustworthiness.
Signaling trustworthiness would not be a good explanation for private charity if the
latter was mainly anonymous. Glazer and Konrad (1996), who discuss the role of charity as
a signal of wealth, address this concern and present data on donations to several American
universities and orchestras. These organisations received less than 1.3% of their donations
anonymously. In addition, they persent data from a large university which reports donors
by brackets of donation levels. The university publishes a list of donors who donate between
$500 and $999, another list for donations in the range $1,000 to $4,999, and so on. Glazer
and Konrad observe a bunching of donations right above the thresholds. Harbaugh (1998)
provides similar evidence for donations to a law school, and Sieg and Zhang (2009) who
analyze more recent data nd that people who give to charity particularly value private
benets which are associated with high social prestige such as invitations to charity dinner
parties. These results suggest that donors at least partly donate for the signal's sake.
This paper studies the role of charity as a signal of trustworthiness in a laboratory
experiment in which subjects play a standard trust game (Berg et al. 1995). Before the
game is played, the trustees have the opportunity to publicly donate money to Amnesty
International (AI). At this stage they know about the game that will be played afterwards
and can, thus, make their choice strategically. The main nding is that donating raises the
other players' beliefs about the trustee's trustworthiness. As a consequence, donors receive
3substantially higher transfers. Moreover, I nd that donors are, indeed, more trustworthy.
The paper proceeds with the experimental design in section 2, with the presentation of
the results in section 3, and the conclusion in section 4.
2 Experimental Design
Half of the subjects are assigned the role of trustors the other half of trustees. Trustors
receive an initial endowment of 10 points, trustees of 14 points. The trustees start by
making a donation of 4 points to Amnesty International or by choosing not to donate.1
After this stage the subjects play a trust game. Trustors can transfer 0, 2, 4, 6, 8 or 10
points to the trustees. They can make their transfer decision conditional on the whether the
trustee has donated or not. The transfers are tripled. The trustees can then send back any
integer amount of points from the points they dispose of after receiving the transfer back to
the trustor. Backtransfers are not tripled. The experiment ends after the backtransfers are
made. It consists of only one round.
To see whether the donors care about the NGO, they are asked about their identication
with AI in a brief questionnaire before the instructions to the experiment were distributed. It
includes questions like \Do you do sports?", \Do you play an instrument?" and the question
\Do you strongly identify yourself with the goals of Amnesty International?". Subjects have
to answer \Yes" or \No". The questionnaire is designed to give the subjects the impression
that they take part in a small socioeconomic survey. This makes it unlikely that they expect
their answers to play a role in the experiment.
Procedural Details
The experiment was conducted together with other experiments. In two sessions (1 and
2), the subjects had already participated in another experiment and participated in a third
after this experiment.2 In sessions 3 and 4, this experiment was the rst and the subjects
only participated in one more experiment. In these sessions the subjects were not informed
that there would be a second experiment until the rst was over. Spill-over eects from
the second experiment were thus impossible in sessions 3 and 4. In sessions 1 and 2, one
1The donations are indeed transfered to AI after the experiment and this was communicated in the written
instructions of the experiment and orally repeated before the start of the experiment.
2The experiment they played before playing this experiment was also a variant of a trust game but with
dierent pairs of subjects and changed roles of trustor and trustee.
4point was worth 0.5 CHF, in sessions 3 and 4, 0.8 CHF. Because of these dierences between
sessions 1 and 2, and session 3 and 4, the data from sessions 3 and 4 are analyzed separately
as a robustness check of the results obtained with the pooled data set.
The strategy method is used, which means that trustors make two transfer decisions, one
for each type of trustee. Trustees make six backtransfer decisions, one for every possible
trustor's transfer.3
A total of 130 subjects participated in the experiment. It was conducted in the laboratory
of the Institut f ur Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung (IEW) at the University of Zurich.4
3 Results
The number of donors is high. Out of 65 trustees, 45 donate and 20 do not.
Trustors were asked about their beliefs regarding backtransfers from donors and non-
donors for all possible transfer levels. Table 1 and Figure 1 show that they believe to receive
substantially higher backtransfers from donors. The expected backtransfer-transfer ratios
(Table 1) are signicantly dierent at the 1% level (adjusted Wald test).
Table 1: Expected backtransfer-transfer ra-
tio for positive transfers.a
Transfer (Std. Err.)
from donors 1.19 (0.08)
from non donors 0.73 (0.09)
N 65
a Standard errors are cluster adjusted.
Regressing beliefs on transfers gives signicantly dierent slopes for the linear ts in
Figure 1 (at the 5% level, adjusted Wald test). In these regressions there are four observations
from every trustor, one for every possible transfer level. This is taken into account in the
3The use of the strategy method in a trust game has been shown to lead to lower trustworthiness as
compared to the \game" method (Casari and Cason 2009). Trust levels were however unaected by the
choice of method. A point which is often made is that the strategy method elicits cooler thinking (e.g.,
Zizzo 2010). In the context of this experiment, this would rather lead to an attenuation of the eect of the
donation on trust than to the contrary, and thus pose a harder test for the hypothesized eect.
4The treatments were programmed with zTree (Fischbacher 2007).
5estimation of the standard errors by treating these four observations as one cluster each.
Nonlinear ts to the data show that the assumption of a linear relation is unproblematic
(see Figures 3 and 4 in the appendix).
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to donors 4.98 (0.45) from donors 0.98 (0.12)
to non donors 2.49 (0.44) from non donors 0.67 (0.14)
N (trustors) 65 N (trustees) 65
a Standard errors for the backtransfer-transfer ratio are cluster adjusted.
The transfer levels to the dierent types of trustees reect these beliefs. Trustors transfer
double to donors than to non-donors, 4.98 and 2.49 points respectively. These transfers
are signicantly dierent from each other (at the 1% level, t-test). As transfers are tripled,
trustees who donate receive 7.5 points more than non-donors, which is a huge dierence. The
6result indicates that charity works well as means to convince others of one's trustworthiness.
Moreover, trustors' beliefs are quite accurate. Figure 2 presents the actual backtransfer
choices of the dierent types of trustees. Donors do indeed transfer back more than non-
donors. The backtransfer-transfer ratios (Table 2) are signicantly dierent at the 10% level
(adjusted Wald test). However, the slopes of linear ts to the data in Figure 2 are not
signicantly dierent from each other (at the 10% level, adjusted Wald test).5





























linear fit non donors
From all 130 participants 45 (25 of them trustors) indicate in the questionnaire that they
identify themselves strongly with the goals of AI. As expected, substantially more subjects
donate to AI, which might be due to the signaling character of the donation. From the 25
trustees who indicate that they identify themselves strongly with the goals of AI 21 donate,
from the remaining 40 non donating trustees only 24. These shares are statistically dierent
at the 5% level (2-Test). Of those who donate, those who also identify themselves with AI
have a higher backtransfer-transfer ratio (1.03 as compared to 0.93). However, this dierence
is not statistically signicant at 10% level (adjusted Wald test).
5In this regression again there are four observations from every subject, one for each possible transfer
level. As before, this is taken into account in the estimation of the standard errors by treating these four
observations as one cluster each.
7Table 3: Identication with AI and the decision to
donate.
Identication No Identication N
Donor 21 24 45
Non donor 4 16 20
N 25 40 65
Analyzing the data from sessions 3 and 4 separately as a robustness check does not change
the main results (see appendix), i.e., the dierence between the conditions in sessions 1 and
2, and sessions 3 and 4 do not inuence the subjects' behavior in an important way.6
4 Conclusion
In this study, the potential of prosocial behavior in general and charity in particular as signals
of trustworthiness is studied in a laboratory experiment. The main nding is that trustees
who publicly donate to Amnesty International (AI) are expected to be more trustworthy and
receive substantially higher transfers in a trust game. Trustors transfers are on average twice
as high to donors than to non-donors. Indeed, donors are more trustworthy than subjects
who do not donate. Charity can, therefore, serve as a signal of trustworthiness.
Partly, subjects care about their reputation of behaving prosocially merely for the social
esteem that comes along with it. This has been shown in several studies. In other settings,
like in this experiment, a reputation of being a prosocial person also comes with substantial
monetary benets. This strengthens the reputational motive for prosocial behavior as de-
scribed, e.g., in B enabou and Tirole (2006) or Elligsen and Johannesson (2008). Moreover,
the results are consistent with costly signaling explanations of the evolution of cooperation
(e.g., Gintis et al. 2001).
6Not all the results are unchanged w.r.t. their level of statistical signicance (see appendix for details).
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10Appendix
The appendix presents gures which show that the assumption of a linear relation in the
regressions is unproblematic, the results from sessions 3 and 4, henceforth called the reduced
sample, and the instructions.7
Figure 3: Beliefs of trustors about backtransfers






































lowess smoother non donors





























lowess smoother non donors
7Only instructions for trustors are presented. Instructions for trustees were very similar. The original
German instructions can be obtained from the author.
11Figures 3 and 4 display the same scatterplots as Figures 1 and 2 but with lowess smoothers
instead of the linear ts. They show that the assumption of a linear relation is unproblematic.
In the reduced sample, just as in the pooled sample, the expected backtransfer-transfer
ratios (Table 4) are statistically dierent at the 1% level (adjusted Wald test). The dierence
in the slopes of the linear ts in Figure 5 are even more pronounced and statistically dierent
at the 1% level (adjusted Wald test).
The dierence in the transfer level (Table 5) are also signicant at the 1% level (t-test),
and the dierences in the backtransfer-transfer ratios at the 10% level (adjusted Wald test).
The dierence in the slopes of the linear ts in Figure 6 is not signicant at the 10%
level (adjusted Wald test). Finally, the 2 value of the test in Table 6 indicates that the
Null-hypothesis of random allocation to the table cells cannot be rejected at the 10% level.
Overall, the results are very similar to the ones obtained from analyzing the pooled
sample.
Table 4: Expected Backtransfer-Transfer
Ratio for positive transfers (reduced
sample).a
Transfer (Std. Err.)
from donors 1.01 (0.11)
from non donors 0.58 (0.13)
N 65
a Standard errors are cluster adjusted





to donors 4.51 (0.67) from donors 1.02 (0.17)
to non donors 2.13 (0.60) from non donors 0.57 (0.18)
N (trustors) 65 N (trustees) 65
a Standard errors for the backtransfer-transfer ratio are cluster adjusted.







































linear fit non donors
Table 6: Identication with AI and the decision to donate
(reduced sample).
Identication No Identication N
Donor 8 13 21
Non donor 2 8 10
N 10 21 31
p-value 2-test 0.31
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Experiment : General Information for  Participant A 
 
 
You will now participate in a scientific experiment. 
 
If you carefully read the following instructions, you can earn money. How much money you will 
earn depends on your decisions and decisions of other participants in the experiment. It is, therefore, 
important to read the instructions carefully. 
 
Please, note that it is not permitted to communicate with other participants during the experiment. If 
you have questions, please, direct them at us. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment all participants receive a show-up fee of 10 CHF. During the 
course of the experiment you can earn points in addition to that. All points you earn are converted 
into Swiss Francs at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate is: 
 
1 Point = 0.80 CHF. 
 
At the end you receive the income you have earned during the experiment plus the 10 CHF show-up 
fee in cash. You will be paid out in a separate room, so that no other participant can see how much 













In this experiment there are always a participant A and  participant B together in a group of two. No 
participant knows the identity of the participant who is in her group, that is, all decisions are made 
anonymously. 
 
You are participant A. 
 
At the beginning participant B receives 4 points. He can donate them to Amnesty International or 
keep them. In case of a donation, all the points that are donated in the experiment are summed up, 
converted into Swiss Francs and transferred to Amnesty International. 
 
You, as a participant A, can make your decisions dependent on whether B has donated or not. 
 
Participants A and B receive 10 points. You, as participant A, can now transfer  0, 2, 4, 6, 8 or 10  
points to B. This transfer is tripled. Participant B can then transfer back any amount out of the points 
he disposes of to you. 
 
The income of both participants is determined in dependence on your and B’s decisions as follows: 
 
You, as participant A, earn 
0 – Your transfer to B +Participant B’s backtransfer to you. 
 
 
Participant B earns 
10 + 3 ×Your transfer to B – B’s backtransfer to you + 4 (in case B does not donate) 
 
 
You can make your decision conditional on whether B has donated or not. You have to make a 
decision for both cases. 
Which of the two cases is relevant for the pay-off will be determined by the actual decision (to 
donate or not) of the participant B you are matched with.  
    16After you have made your transfer decisions, participant B learns how much you have transferred 
and makes his transfer decision. 
 
After all participants have made their decisions, the experiment ends. Your income will be paid out 
privately, so that the other participants do not know how much you have earned. 
 
Control Questions 
Please, answer the following control questions. Your answers do not influence the pay-offs of the 
experiment but only serve to check whether everybody understands the experiment. When you have 
finished, please, raise your hand, so that we can check your answers. 
 
Question 1: You are Participant A. How many transfer decisions are you going to make in this 
experiment? 
 
Question 2: You are Participant A. What determines which of your decisions becomes relevant for 
the pay-offs? 
 
Question 3: You are Participant A. Assume, your pay-off relevant transfer to B is 4 points, 
Participant B has donated and her backtransfer to you is 6 points.  
What is your income? 
What is participant B’s income? 
 
Question 4: You are Participant A. Assume, your pay-off relevant transfer to B is 6 points, 
Participant B has not donated and her backtransfer to you is 0 points.  
What is your income? 
What is participant B’s income? 
 
Question 5: You are Participant A. Assume, your pay-off relevant transfer to B is 10 points, 
Participant B has donated and her backtransfer to you is 20 points.  
What is your income? 
What is participant B’s income? 
 
Do you have questions? 
    17